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In the current global era, progress is happening very fast, companies all over the world are competing to continue 
to survive and win in increasingly fierce business competition. One way for companies to win in the competition 
is to win the hearts of consumers, which will lead to customer loyalty to the brand of the company. This research 
was conducted to determine the effect of brand reputation, brand relationship quality, and switching costs on 
brand loyalty in Nike brand basketball shoes. The data collection technique in this study was using purposive 
sampling. While the data processing method was done using validity, reliability, and descriptive statistical 
analysis. For the data analysis method used was PLS-SEM which was a multivariate analysis technique consisting 
of analysis of outer model, inner model, and hypothesis testing. From the results of this study, it was known that 
brand reputation and brand relationship quality significantly influence brand loyalty in Nike brand basketball 
shoes. While switching costs proved to be able to moderate the relationship between brand reputation to brand 
loyalty and the relationship of brand relationship quality to brand loyalty significantly. 
 




The main goal for every company is not only to survive but also to win the intense competition through 
focusing into what customer needs and wants (Chadhiq, 2007). These type of company hope to provide 
customer convenience and stimulate repeat purchase behavior. This kind of customer behavior will lead 
to brand loyalty and will lead to the creation of revenue for company sustainability (Istijanto, 2009). 
Dick and Basu (1994) argued that the company must adopt certain unique strategy and approach for 
instance by emphasizing on brand reputation, utilizing customer relationship, and directing the entire 
company resources to improve customer loyalty. 
 
A reputable brand plays significant role in determining consumer behavior in terms of product selection 
and it will lead to brand loyalty. Therefore, whenever the customers had received the product benefits 
or values then the customers tend to be loyal to the particular brand and tend to be less price sensitive 
(Wibisono, 2015). Nevertheless, several research findings showed the influences of brand reputation 
towards customer loyalty, on the contrary some other research showed the opposite findings. The 
company with a reputable brand somehow neglected its customers by making a certain services 
mistakes and as the consequences this will lead the customer to do brand switching (Ott, 2013). Aydin, 
Ozer, and Arazil (2005) explained that switching cost moderating the effect of reputable brand towards 
customer loyalty by reducing customer sensitivity on product performance evaluation. 
 
Nike as one of the reputable brands worldwide is perceived highly by its loyal customer to increase 
their self-prestige or to gain a certain group status or symbol. Nowadays the customer has so many 
advantages in terms of information through the development of internet and technology, the customer 
can easily browse from A to Z regarding their favorable brand. As the consequences, the customers 
have more expectations toward the brand performances to fulfill their needs and wants. This research 
will investigate the effect of brand loyalty toward brand loyalty through brand relationship quality as 
the intervening variable and switching cost as the moderating variable by using Nike brand as the object 
study. 






Brand reputation is the customer opinion either positive or negative towards a particular brand. The 
factors which affected brand reputation are the product quality, product performances, product 
advertisement, and product publication. Moreover, brand reputation plays significant roles to stimulate 
a positive customer expectation (Creed & Miles, 1996). In addition, Shandi (2011) stated that brand 
reputation as the customer base to evaluate brand reliability. Alam and Yasin (2010) added that previous 
customer experience, word of mouth, media publicity, and company public relation toward the brand 
are the factors impacting to brand reputation. Next, Aaker (1991) mentioned four indicators to measure 
brand reputation, they are memorability, uniqueness, personality. 
  
Brand Relationship Quality 
According to Sheth and Mittal (2004) brand relationship quality is relationship oriented view of 
consumer brand interaction which are positively held, voluntarily engaged, long term and affectively 
intense (in short, brand-loyal relations) in nature. Keller and Kotler (2008) added there are five 
indicators to measure brand relationship quality, they are intimacy, self-concept connection, 
love/passion, interdependence, commitment, and quality partner. Brand relationship quality refers to 
the important perception to foster entire things related to the brand in purpose to win the intense 
competition, therefore the company may use brand relationship quality to increase market share as well 
as to increase profit and as foundation to support marketing strategy program (Sweeney & Chew, 2002).  
 
Switching Cost 
Caruana (2003) explained switching cost as the cost which is occurred as the consequences of customer 
decision to do brand or product switching. Company can use switching cost as a tool to create barrier 
and to maintain its customers. There are three main important factors affecting switching cost, they are 
financial switching cost, procedural switching cost, and relational switching cost. In addition, Trijp 
(1996) argued two types of customer motivation to do brand switching, they are internal motives and 
external motives. The internal motives or true variety seeking behavior is a switching behavior in 
purpose to search for variation to avoid personal boredom, to fulfil the anxiety towards the new brand. 
Meanwhile the external motives or derived varied behavior is the switching behavior caused by other 
brand functional values for example the cheaper price, more product feature, etc. 
 
Brand Loyalty 
Brand loyalty is the loyalty measurement towards a particular brand (Rangkuti, 2002). In addition, 
Hawkins and Mothersbaugh (2013) explained that brand loyalty made customer less price sensitive 
toward the changing of the price. Next Aaker (1991) divide brand loyalty into five categories; they are 
brand awareness, brand association, brand quality, brand asset, and brand loyalty. There are two 
methods in measuring brand loyalty; firstly, is attitudinal brand loyalty which refers to customer 
tendency to do product repeat buying in the future and to recommend the brand to other customers, 
secondly is behavioral brand loyalty which refers to customer activity to do product repeat buying in 
certain period of time and the tendency to spend the majority of customer income to buy the certain 
brand (Chahal & Mehta, 2010).  
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
This research is using quantitative research approach, non-probability sampling with purposive 
sampling method. There are 120 respondents which are collected based on these criteria; age 
between 18–40 years old, residing in Surabaya City, registered at a basketball communi ty, using 
Nike brand at least six times when playing basketball within three previous months. The researcher 
visited several basketball communities in Surabaya City to collect the research data by distributing 
the questionnaire and interviewing the potential respondent. 
 
Measurement 
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The research using structural equation modelling through PLS to measure research variable. The 
research variables are Brand Reputation as independent variable, Brand Loyalty as dependent variable, 
Brand Relationship Quality as the intervening variable, and Switching Cost as the moderating variable. 
   
FINDINGS  
Description Analysis 
The result for description analysis showed that the respondent perceived Nike brand as a good 
reputable brand, the respondents have a good brand relationship quality with Nike brand, the 
respondent loyal to Nike brand, and finally the respondents perceived high switching cost for Nike 
brand. There are rooms to be improved especially for brand relationship quality by improving 
customer trust and customer love toward Nike brand. 
 
Hypotheses Testing  
The research variables have meet the minimum requirement for validity and reliability testing. There 
are five hypotheses for this research:  
H1: Brand Reputation affecting Brand Relationship Quality 
H2: Brand Reputation affecting Brand Loyalty 
H3: Brand Relationship Quality affecting Brand Loyalty 
H4: Switching Cost moderating the effect of Brand Reputation to Brand Loyalty 
H5: Switching Cost moderating the effect of Brand Relationship Quality to Brand Loyalty 
 
The research structural model can be seen on Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure1. PLS structural model 
Based on hypotheses testing, it can be concluded that those five hypotheses were significantly accepted.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Based on research findings showed that brand reputation significantly affecting brand relationship 
quality, the biggest loading factor score on brand reputation indicates that customer trust on Nike brand 
(product quality, store services) plays significant role in creating brand reputation. Nike management 
need to focus on its product quality and services to maintain its brand reputation in purpose to keep 
brand loyalty. This finding supported Seo and Park (2017) which explained that the company need to 
keep innovating in purpose to be the best it its product category and as the consequences it will lead to 
brand loyalty. Next brand reputation also affecting brand relationship quality, the higher Nike brand 
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reputation will increase the level of customer engagement or relationship toward the brand. Giovanis 
and Athanasopoulou (2016) argued that the company has to improve its product quality in order to keep 
brand reputation and it will stimulate brand relationship quality. The finding showed that customer has 
a high relationship toward Nike brand and also showed that customer switching cost is high which mean 
the customer face more cost if they switch from Nike brand to other footwear product brand. This 
finding is consistent with Aydin et al. (2005) who explained that the company has to create more barrier 
to exit for its customers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Brand loyalty is the main goal for every company by considering the benefits gained from this customer 
behavior. Brand reputation plays significant and very important roles in creating brand loyalty. The 
reputation can be improved by innovating product quality and product services. In addition, the 
company also need to focus on developing brand relationship quality through improving customer trust 
and customer love toward the brand. Finally, the company need to keep its performance in every aspect 
of the product in purpose to create the exit barrier both emotional and functional barrier. This barrier 
will increase customer switching cost and will impact to brand loyalty. 
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This research purpose was to obtain empirical evidence regarding the effect of institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, foreign ownership, board of directors’ meeting, board of directors’ size, female board of directors, firm 
size, return on asset, leverage, and audit quality on earnings management. The Population of this research was all 
non-financial companies consistently listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2019. Purposive sampling 
was used to select 144 companies used as the research samples. Multiple regression and hypotheses test were used 
as the data analysis method. The result of this research statistically showed that firm size had negative effect on 
earnings management. Leverage had positive effect on earnings management. The other variables including 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, board of directors’ meeting, board of directors’ 
size, female board of directors, return on asset, and audit quality had no influence on earnings management in non-
financial companies listed in Indonesia. 
 





The rise of globalization in business and financial aspects cause the need to conduct comparative 
evaluation of reports between different countries (Jaggi & Leung, 2007). High reliance on financial 
information results in higher demand of quality reporting (Alareeni, 2018), as in financial statements 
should not include asymmetric information and earnings manipulation (Lawal, Nwanji, Opeyemi, & 
Adama, 2018). 
 
Earnings manipulation is an act of management to manipulate earnings to report more favorable results 
(Beneish, 1999), and one of the methods include earnings management. Earnings management increases 
informational asymmetries between outsiders and insiders, causing adverse consequences including 
shareholders’ wealth deterioration (Abad, Lucas-Pérez, Minguez-Vera, & Yagüe,  2017). Its pertinence 
leads to its popularity in being widely reviewed and evaluated in accounting literatures (Obigbemi, 
Omolehinwa, Mukoro, Ben-Caleb, & Olusanmi, 2016). This practice can occur in the preparation of 
financial statements using accrual basis (Gao, Gao, & Wang, 2017), and it is called accrual earnings 
management. 
 
Several cases of known earnings management have occurred in Indonesia. The most recent one comes 
from a well-known Indonesian airline company, PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk (Hartomo, 2019). The case 
started in early April 2019 when the financial statement of 2018 was published, showing a net income 
amounted to USD 809.85 thousand despite its net loss in 2017 that amounted to USD 216.5 thousand. 
On the other hand, two commissioners of PT Garuda Indonesia believed the 2018 financial statement is 
not prepared in accordance with Financial Accounting Standard (PSAK). After several findings and 
processes, PT Garuda Indonesia was found recording accounts payable amounting to USD 239 million 
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from PT Mahata Aero Teknologi as revenue. The case ended with Financial Services Authority (OJK), 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, and Minister of Finance giving sanctions towards PT Garuda Indonesia, 
Kasner Sirumapea (a public accountant), and Tanubrata, Susanto, Fahmi, Bambang, and Partners Public 
Accounting Firm. From this case, it can be seen that earnings management is something that can be 
detected by of corporate governance, and by checking the possible abnormalities. 
 
Due to cases of earnings management, the need to understand the determinants of earnings management 
emerged, including understanding of the nature of the factors, its affecting levels, and the direction of 
its influence (Dang, Hoang, & Tran,  2017). All of which are in order for financial statement users to 
obtain wider insights before making economic decisions. In developed countries, earnings management 
has been studied extensively; however, in developing countries like Indonesia, only a few studies have 
been conducted. This remain true especially for relation of topic specific to ownership structure and 
board of directors’ characteristics as determinants toward earnings management. These situations hence 
motivate writer to conduct this research with the topic of earnings management and to obtain better 
insights regarding the influence of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, 
board of directors’ meeting, board of directors’ size, female board of directors, firm size, return on asset, 
leverage, and audit quality on earnings management. 
 
Agency Theory 
Firms were originally owned and managed by same parties, however as firms grew, agency divergence 
arose between agents and principals (Godfrey, Hodgson, Tarca, Hamilton, & Holmes, 2010), leading to 
firms roles as of contracts for agreements between different stakeholders (Megginson, 1997). This 
divergence causes agency theory emergence. Agency theory studies about agency problems arising from 
conflict of interest between principal and agents when both parties are utility maximizers (Linder & 
Foss, 2015). This occurs in an agency relationship where agents are under contact to perform service 
and decision making in the place of principals after authority delegation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
As agents are not the real bearer of wealth effects of their choices (Panda & Leepsa, 2017) and the 
existence of asymmetric information due to agents being closer to the firms operations, there is 
opportunity for agents to engage in self-interested behavior (Juhmani, 2017), which will incur agency 
costs (Bendickson, Muldoon, Liguori, & Davis,  2016). Jensen et al. (1976) defined agency costs as the 
sum of (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal; (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent; and 
(3) the residual loss. One of practices made possible due to this issue, and in turn corroborate agency 
problems is earnings managements. 
 
Earnings Management 
Earnings management is an practice by management to maximize loopholes in reporting standards with 
self-interested purpose at the costs of direct or indirect stakeholders (Obigbemi et al., 2016). This 
unethical intentional practice cause financial statements alteration (Bello, 2011), which incite problem 
as stakeholders are being misled in the firms’ underlying economic performance and adversely 
influences outcomes which depend on those information (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Saona, Muro, and 
Alvarado (2019) considered earnings management as the direct consequence of agency problems. 
 
There are several means for managers to engage in earnings management, including real and accrual 
earnings management. Roychowdhury (2006) pointed out real earnings management involves actual 
departures from normal operational practices, while accrual earnings management put more emphasize 
in exploiting accounting accruals (Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019). It is also called cosmetic earnings 
management as it doesn’t involve actual cash flow consequences (Subramanyam & Wild, 2009). 
 
The Effects of Ownership Structure and Board of Directors’ Characteristics on Earnings Management, pp. 6–21 
 
 
Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management 
Institutional ownership defined as shares owned by institutional shareholders (Suwana, Purnomosidhi, 
& Mardiati, 2017), usually in proportion compared to the firm’s outstanding shares (Farooque, Suyono, 
& Rosita,  2013). It is considered as important governance mechanism (Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019), 
as institutions have higher monitoring power to prevent earnings management practices (San Martin 
Reyna, 2018). 
 
Anwar and Buvanendra (2019) and Alzoubi (2016) found institutional ownership had a negative 
significant relation with earnings management. It means institutional ownership helps reduce earnings 
management, due to big institutional investors will actively monitor their investments. However, 
Pradipta (2019) and Asitalia and Trisnawati (2017) found insignificant relation between institutional 
ownership and earnings management in Indonesia. The same results were obtain in Indonesia by Firnanti 
(2017), Almalita (2017) and Guna and Herawaty (2010). 
 
Ha1: Institutional Ownership has influence on earnings management. 
 
Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management 
Managerial ownership is defined as shares owned by the firm’s management in proportion to the 
outstanding shares (Mueller & Spitz-Oener, 2006), typically considered as corporate governance 
mechanism to prevent earnings management practices. As managers owned the firm’s shares, their goals 
will align to shareholders’ interest (Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019). 
 
Anwar and Buvanendra (2019) found a significant negative relation between managerial ownership and 
earnings management. Contrary to that, Ilmas, Tahir, Asrar-ul-Haq, and McMillan (2018) found that 
managerial ownership had a significant positive effect toward earnings management. Meanwhile, 
Nugroho and Eko (2012), Asitalia and Trisnawati (2017), Yunietha and Palupi (2017), and Napitupulu 
(2012) found that managerial ownership did not show a significant effect on earnings management 
practices in Indonesia, due to the fact managerial ownership made up a small amount of total ownership. 
 
Ha2: Managerial Ownership has influence on earnings management. 
 
Foreign Ownership and Earnings Management 
Foreign ownership is the proportion of shares being owned by individuals or institutions that have 
foreign status in term of the firms’ country (Sumilat & Destriana, 2017). Foreign investors are perceived 
as effective monitoring unit to prevent earnings management, due to their creativity in seeking 
information (Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019). 
 
In line with that, Alzoubi (2016) and Alexander (2019) researches showed that foreign ownership has a 
significant negative impact on earnings management. However, Anwar and Buvanendra (2019) and 
Farouk and Bashir (2017) found otherwise, probably due to high monitoring costs incurred by foreign 
investors leading to bigger chance for management to do opportunistic behavior. Lack of managerial 
know-how, financial resources, and expertise of foreign investors, and possibility of foreign investors 
only interested in short-term returns might also affect these findings. The result obtained was different 
in Malaysian companies (Mohd Ali, Mohd Salleh, & Hassan, 2008), showing an insignificant 
relationship between foreign ownership and earnings management. 
 
Ha3: Foreign Ownership has influence on earnings management. 
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Number of Board Meetings and Earnings Management 
Obigbemi et al. (2016) defined board meeting as the routine formal meeting held by board of directors 
to review performance, discuss policy issues, and address problems and other inquiries. Higher 
frequency of board meetings is often perceived as indicators of board members diligence. This diligence 
will create more powerful monitoring power, making operations and preparation of financial statements 
are more controlled, therefore lowering earnings management practices (Obigbemi et al., 2016). 
 
Obigbemi et al. (2016) and Ngamchom (2015) found positive significant relationship between number 
of board meetings and earnings management, indicating that board that use too much time in board 
meeting will then have less time to actually oversee management’s performance (Jensen, 1993). On the 
other hand, Xie et al. (2003), Gulzar and Zongjun (2011), and Kankanamage (2016) found a significant 
negative relationship, showing that board acts as effective monitors. Alzoubi (2016) found insignificant 
relationship between board meetings and earnings management, indicating lack of effectiveness of board 
meeting due to the fact that daily duties restricts members time to set board meeting agenda. 
 
Ha4: Board of Directors’ Meeting has influence on earnings management. 
 
Board of Directors’ Size and Earnings Management 
Board of directors are those who have highest rank in internal management system, their tasks include 
supervising and controlling the management (Nugroho & Eko, 2011). Board size is the number of 
members in its board of directors. The impact of board size toward earnings management is not 
conclusive (Saona et al. 2019). Some suggests more board members mean more parties that act as 
monitoring units to prevent earnings management. Others argued smaller board size will be more 
dynamic. Their monitoring activities will be organized and aligned, making them more effective in 
lowering earnings management practices. 
 
Gulzar and Zongjun (2011) found a significant positive relationship between board size and earnings 
management practices. On the other hand, Khosheghbal, Amiri, and Homayoon (2017) found that there 
is no significant effect of board size on earnings management of companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
The same result of insignificant relation between board size and earnings management was also found 
by Asitalia and Trisnawati (2017). In Indonesia, Yunietha and Palupi (2017) found insignificant 
relationship between board size and earnings management. On the contrary, Obigbemi et al. (2016) and 
Saona et al. (2019) found board size had a significant negative effect toward earnings management. 
 
Ha5: Board of Directors’ Size has influence on earnings management. 
 
Female Board of Directors and Earnings Management 
Saona et al. (2019) defined female directors as the proportion of female board members in the board of 
directors. Female board of directors actively participate and present in a board of directors as one of the 
board members can lower earnings management, because female tends to be more sensitive toward 
ethical issues (Abad et al., 2017).  
 
Obigbemi et al. (2016), Ocak and Arıkboğa (2017), Temiz, Dalkılıç, and Hacıhasanoğlu (2018), Saona 
et al. (2019), and Gulzar and Zongjun (2011) found that the existence of females in board of directors 
had negative significant impact on earnings management. The possible reason is the fact that women 
tend have higher moral and more sensitive toward manipulative practices. However, a study conducted 
in Malaysian listed companies showed a different result that there is insignificant relation between 
female board members and earnings management (Abdullah & Ismail, 2016). The same result was 
obtain by Arun, Almahrog, and Ali-aribi  (2015). 
 
The Effects of Ownership Structure and Board of Directors’ Characteristics on Earnings Management, pp. 6–21 
 
 
Ha6: Female Board of Directors has influence on earnings management. 
 
Firm Size and Earnings Management 
Firm size is an indicator to determine the company capabilities to manage stockholders investment by 
improving their welfare, and it can be shown by the firm total assets (Farooque et al., 2013). Bassiouny 
(2016) stated that bigger firm have stronger internal control which will result in lower earnings 
management practices. However, San Martin Reyna (2018) stated larger firms face greater expectation, 
heightening the pressure to deliver good performance in financial statements, making them inclined to 
conduct earnings management practices. 
 
Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe, and Bernard (2015) and San Martin Reyna (2018) found a significant positive 
relationship between firm size and earnings management. This implies that growing firms have higher 
motivations to engage in earnings management practice because of the complexity of their transactions, 
believing that it is harder for users to identify overstatement. Another possible explanation is the bigger 
the firm, the more pressure the firm has to conduct earnings management. Contrary to those, Yasser and 
Soliman (2018) and Anwar and Buvanendra (2019) found a significant negative relationship between 
firm size and earnings management, Alareeni (2018) found that the relationship between firm size and 
earnings management are not significant. Bassiouny (2016), Juhmani (2017), Saniamisha and Tjhai 
(2019), and Llukani (2013) also got the same results. 
 
Ha7: Firm Size has influence on earnings management. 
 
Return on Asset and Earnings Management 
Return on asset is one of profitability ratio, measuring the capabilities of the management in generating 
earnings by utilizing its available assets (Yuliana & Trisnawati, 2015). Therefore it is usually measured 
by net income divided by total assets (Susanto, 2013). The underlying assumption of management 
wanting to get bonuses from their performance will cause management to pursue earnings management 
to obtain higher return on asset, causing return on asset to have positive correlation with earnings 
management. However, Susanto (2013) stated that investors do realize earnings reported in financial 
statement have susceptibility to management manipulation, therefore return on asset will not affect 
earnings management. 
 
Florencia and Susanty (2019), Firnanti (2017), Guna and Herawaty (2010) found positive significant 
relation between return on asset and earnings management. Conversely, Alzoubi (2016) and Ali, Chen, 
and Radhakrishnan (2007) found negative influence between return on asset and earnings management. 
The reason is because of the fact that companies with already high return on asset as in profitability, 
there will be no motivation anymore for the management to conduct earnings management practices. 
However, Susanto (2013) and Chandra and Djashan (2018) found no correlation. The reason is because 
investors realize the possibility of manipulation in earnings reported in financial statement due to its 
accrual nature, so there will be no reason for management to be motivated based on this. 
 
Ha8: Return on Asset has influence on earnings management. 
 
Leverage and Earnings Management 
According to Mustamin and Usman (2019), financial leverage is a ratio used to determine how much 
the firm’s assets are financed by debt. Leverage is a ratio between total liabilities and total asset, 
therefore the higher the leverage, the higher the total liabilities of a firm (Yuliana & Trisnawati, 2015). 
Khanh and Thu (2019) stated higher leverage shows higher liabilities, which might increase the 
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existence of debt covenants that the companies must abide to. This can pressure companies to manage 
their earnings to meet those debt covenants. 
 
Uwuigbe et al. (2015), Juhmani (2017), and Chandra and Djashan (2018) found insignificant 
relationship between leverage and earnings management. There are many researches that obtained 
significant positive correlation as well. Bassiouny (2016) found a significant positive relation between 
financial leverage and earnings management. Yasser and Soliman (2018), San Martin Reyna (2018) and 
Anwar and Buvanendra (2019) also found significant positive relation between leverage and earnings 
management. The higher the leverage, the more associated companies with earnings management. The 
same result was also obtained by Mustamin and Usman (2019), in line with agency theory. 
 
Ha9: Leverage has influence on earnings management. 
 
Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
Suseno (2013) emphasized audit quality as the ability of an auditor to identify material misstatement in 
financial statements, and also the willingness of auditors to issue unbiased audit opinion based on the 
true audit results. Yasser and Soliman (2018) suggested that high quality audit is often associated with 
big four auditors, because they have greater number of clients leading to them having higher 
independence. In addition, big four auditors have more to lose and need to maintain their reputation. 
From the technical side, big four auditors have more resources and therefore can provide better services. 
Due to those reasons, big four auditors will conduct more thorough audit and discover earnings 
management practices during their audit. 
 
Bassiouny (2016) and Yasser and Soliman (2018) found that firm’s audit quality has insignificant impact 
toward earnings management, meaning that big four could not constrain earnings management practices 
in Egyptian companies. In Indonesia, Yunietha and Palupi (2017) and Napitupulu (2012) obtained the 
same result, indicating that earnings management remain unaffected regardless of whether firms audited 
by big four or non-big four auditors. 
 
Uniquely, Lisboa (2016) found that audit from big four companies has significant positive impact toward 
earnings management.  The reason possibly due to the fact that the samples were taken during financial 
crisis period. This could due to the fact that big four auditors have dependency on their clients, the firms. 
Anwar and Buvanendra (2019) and Guna and Herawaty (2010) obtained significant negative relation 
between big four auditors and earnings management, it means that big four auditors are likely to disclose 
material errors, leading to discouragement toward earnings management. 
 
Ha10: Audit Quality has influence on earnings management. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The population used for this research is all non-financial companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
from 2017 to 2019. The samples are selected by purposive sampling based on criteria summarized 
below.  
 
Table 1 shows that the population of this research are 436 non-financial companies consistently listed 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2019. After filtering the population with the criteria above, 
the number of companies that pass the filter and therefore will be used as samples in this research is 114 
firms, which is equivalent to 342 data if multiplied by three years. 









Non-financial companies consistently listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2019 
436 1,308 
Not consistently published financial statements 
ended as of December 31st from 2016 to 2019 
(87) (261) 
Not consistently used IDR currency in the financial 
statements from 2016 to 2019 
(1) (3) 
Not consistently disclose managerial ownership 
from 2017 to 2019 
(179) (537) 
Not consistently disclose institutional ownership 
from 2017 to 2019 
(12) (36) 
Not consistently disclose foreign ownership from 
2017 to 2019 
(43) (129) 
Number of sample firms used 114 342 
Source: Data is obtained and processed from IDX (www.idx.co.id) 
 
Operational Definition of Variables and Measurement 
The dependent variable of this research is earnings management. The proxy used for earnings 
management is the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) estimated through the 
performance-matched discretionary accrual model of Kothari et al. (2005), thereby adopting the same 
proxy with Anwar and Buvanendra's (2019) research. According to Alves (2012), this proxy is the most 
commonly used proxy for earnings management. Discretionary accruals (DACC) are calculated by 
following several steps. The first step is to find total accruals. Total accruals is considered as a 
prerequisite to run the regression (Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019). Cash flow approach is adopted to 
evaluate total accruals (TA). According to cash flow approach, TA is the difference between net income 
before extraordinary items (NI) and cash flow from operating activities (OCF). Therefore to calculate 
total accruals, the formula is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐴 = 𝑁𝐼 − 𝑂𝐶𝐹 
 
After total accruals are found, then the next step is to find the regression residuals from the equation 




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖 [
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
] + 𝛽2𝑖 [
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
] + 𝛽3𝑖 [
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
] + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Where, 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 Total accruals for the company i in the year t 
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 Total assets for the company i at the end of year t-1 
𝛽0 Intercept 
𝛽1 − 𝛽4 Coefficients 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 Change in revenue for the company i between t-1 and t 
∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 Change in receivables for the company i between year t-1 and t 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 Gross property, plant, and equipment for the company i in the year t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 Return on assets for the company i in year t 







Institutional ownership is the total percentage of common stock held by institutional shareholders 
(Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019). The same measurement was used in research conducted by Firnanti 





Managerial ownership is the total percentage of common stock directly owned by management (Guna 
& Herawaty, 2010). The definition from Nugroho and Eko (2011) is the same, that is common stocks 
owned by management which includes board of directors and board of commissioners. Therefore, 






Foreign ownership is the total percentage of common stock owned by foreign (non-resident) 
shareholders (Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019). The same measurement was used by Alzoubi (2016). 




Number of Board Meetings 
Number of board meetings is the frequency of board meetings held in a firm in the respective financial 
year (Obigbemi et al., 2016). Board meetings is measured by a ratio scale, and the measurement for 




Board of Directors’ Size 
Board of directors’ size is measured by the number of board members consisting a particular firm board 





Female Board of Directors 
Female board of directors is the proportion of female board members in the board of directors of a 
particular firm (Saona et al., 2019). The same proxy will be used in this research. Female board of 
directors is measured by a ratio scale and the measurement of female board of directors is as follows: 
 
 




Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, according to Anwar and Buvanendra 
(2019) and Alzoubi (2016). Firm size is measured by a ratio scale and thus the proxy used to measure 




Return on Asset 
Return on asset is measured by dividing total assets of the firm in the respective year with net income 
as in profit after tax of the same year (Anwar & Buvanendra, 2019) and (Alzoubi 2016). Return on asset 





Leverage describes the relationship between total company’s liabilities and total company’s asset. 
Financial leverage is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Anwar & Buvanendra 2019).  
Financial leverage is measured by a ratio scale (Alzoubi, 2016) and the proxy to be used as the 





Audit quality is often associated with big four auditors (Yasser & Soliman, 2018). The same proxy was 
used by Anwar and Buvanendra (2019). In determining audit quality, big four auditors will be used as 
the proxy. If the firm is audited by big four auditors, then this variable will be coded as 1, otherwise 
audit quality (𝐴𝑄) will be coded as 0. This research will follow the same proxy to measure audit quality. 
Audit quality is measured by nominal scale. 
 
Data Analysis Method 
After the data is collected, the data is processed using analysis software. Data analysis method used in 
this research is multiple regression to examine the influence of several independent variables to one 
dependent variable in this context earnings management. The empirical model used in this research to 







ABSDACC = absolute value of discretionary accruals 
 = intercept 
1-11 = variable coefficients 
INS = institutional ownership 
MAN = managerial ownership 
FOR = foreign ownership 
BMEET = board of directors’ meeting 
BSIZE = board of directors’ size 
BFEM = female board of directors 
SIZE = firm size 
ROA = return on asset 
LEV = leverage 
AQ = audit quality 
 = residual of   
 
FINDINGS 
Descriptive statistics is used to showed about the mean, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation 




 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ABSDACC 342 0.0000000 0.3306256 0.0528748 0.0516323 
INS 342 0.0004902 0.9993591 0.7767548 0.2413272 
MAN 342 0.0000001 0.8492501 0.0865933 0.1716691 
FOR 342 0.0000018 0.9452213 0.2636469 0.2693380 
BMEET 342 4.0000000 60.0000000 18.9400000 12.0370000 
BSIZE 342 2.0000000 14.0000000 5.3500000 2.0220000 
BFEM 342 0.0000000 0.6666667 0.1541420 0.1938457 
SIZE 342 24.6236231 33.4945330 29.0982607 1.7815774 
ROA 342 -1.4652625 0.4666014 0.0320537 0.1316290 
LEV 342 0.0063616 1.5385151 0.4652092 0.2085841 




Correlation Coefficient Test 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.272a 0.074 0.046 0.050 
a. Predictors: (Constant), INS, MAN, FOR, BMEET, BSIZE, BFEM, 
SIZE, ROA, LEV, AQ 




The t-test result shows significance level of institutional ownership (INS) is 0.070. It is above 0.050. 
Ha1 is rejected. This means institutional ownership has no influence to earnings management. This 
might happen due to consistently similar level of institutional ownership throughout firms in 
Indonesia. 
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The t-test result shows significance level of managerial ownership (MAN) is 0.294. It is above 0.050. 
Ha2 is rejected. This means managerial ownership has no influence to earnings management. This 
result may be due to the fact that managerial ownership level in Indonesia is small. 
 
The t-test result shows significance level of foreign ownership (FOR) is 0.609. It is above 0.050. Ha3 
is rejected. This means foreign ownership has no influence to earnings management. Possible reasons 
include higher monitoring costs incurred by foreign investors, lack of insights from the foreign 




Variable B Sig. Decision 
INS 0.000 0.070 Ha1 rejected 
MAN 0.000 0.294 Ha2 rejected 
FOR -0.0001 0.609 Ha3 rejected 
BMEET -0.0001 0.692 Ha4 rejected 
BSIZE -0.001 0.446 Ha5 rejected 
BFEM 0.018 0.199 Ha6 rejected 
SIZE -0.007 0.002 Ha7 accepted 
ROA 0.021 0.365 Ha8 rejected 
LEV 0.040 0.006 Ha9 accepted 
AQ 0.006 0.356 Ha10 rejected 
Dependent variable DACC 
 
 
The t-test result shows significance level of board of directors’ meeting (BMEET) is 0.692. It is 
above 0.050. Ha4 is rejected. This means board of directors’ meeting has no influence to earnings 
management, possibly due to no real correlation between the frequency of meetings to earnings 
management prevention. 
 
The t-test result shows significance level of board of directors’ size (BSIZE) is 0.446. It is above 
0.050. Ha5 is rejected. This means board of directors’ size has no influence to earnings management. 
This means regardless of the board size, earnings management remain unaffected. 
 
The t-test result shows significance level of female board of directors (BFEM) is 0.199. It is above 
0.050. Ha6 is rejected. This means female board of directors has no influence to earnings 
management, possibly due to low number of female board members existence in Indonesian listed 
firms. 
 
The t-test result shows significance level of firm size (SIZE) is 0.002. It is below 0.050. Ha7 is 
accepted. This means firm size has influence to earnings management. The negative coefficient 
showed that firm size has negative significant influence on earnings management. It means the bigger 
the firm, the lower the earnings management practices. Larger firms may have stronger internal 
control system and more competent internal auditors compared to smaller firms. This will lead to 
stronger corporate governance, helping in publishing reliable and high quality financial statement. 
Larger firms are also usually audited by big four, causing effective audit which will prevent earnings 
management better. Another reason would be due to higher reputation cost in larger firms. These 
three reasons prevent larger firms to engage in earnings management practices (Bassiouny, 2016). 
 
The t-test result showed significance level of return on asset (ROA) is 0.365. It is above 0.050. Ha8 
is rejected. This means return on asset has no influence to earnings management. The reason is 
because investors realize the possibility of manipulation in earnings reported in financial statement 






The t-test result showed significance level of leverage (LEV) is 0.006. It is below 0.050. Ha9 is 
accepted. This means leverage has influence to earnings management. The positive coefficient 
showed that leverage has positive significant influence on earnings management. It means the higher 
the leverage, the higher the earnings management practices. High leverage means higher proportion 
of the firm’s assets being financed using liabilities, including debt. This might increase the existence 
of debt covenants that the companies must abide to, pressuring companies to make sure the 
performance look well and to meet those covenants (Khanh & Thu, 2019) Therefore, higher leverage 
increase the possibility of earnings management practices. 
 
The t-test result showed significance level of audit quality (AQ) is 0.356. It is above 0.050. Ha10 is 
rejected. This means audit quality has no influence to earnings management. Possible reason includes 
other characteristics of audit might affect earnings management more including audit tenure, industry 
specialization, audit committee characteristics, and audit tenure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the result of this research which is conducted on 114 non-financial companies consistently 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2019, it can be concluded that firm size and leverage 
have influence on earnings management. Meanwhile, other variables including institutional owner-
ship, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, board of directors’ meeting, board of directors’ size, 
female board of directors, return on asset, and audit quality have no influences toward earnings 
management. 
 
In sum, findings of this study highlight the significance of firm factors, especially firm size and 
leverage. Firm size helps to prevent earnings management practice. Larger firms may have stronger 
internal control in place including organized corporate governance and internal audit, coupled with 
them having higher reputation cost to protect. These reasons cause larger firms to have lower 
earnings management practices. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage tend to practice 
earnings management. Such findings may occur as the existence of higher leverage may pressure 
firms to keep up performance by conduct earnings management to abide to the existing debt 
covenants. Opposed to the expectation, ownership structure and board of directors’ characteristics 
have no influence on earnings management. The reasons could include low presence or impact of 
such variables in Indonesian companies and consistently similar level of the variables throughout the 
companies in Indonesia. The findings of this study recommend that both regulators and policy-
makers need to consider firm factors and the different impacts they have on earnings management. 
At the same time, investors could make their future investing decisions by considering that firm size 
helps prevent earnings management whereas leverage increase the possibility of such practices. 
 
This study only focuses on accrual-based earnings management, while there is another type of 
earnings management known as real activity-based earnings management as proposed by 
Roychowdhury (2006). In addition, several limitations exist in this research, including (1) the data 
of this research are not normally distributed; (2) this research contains heteroscedasticity problem; 
and (3) only two independent variables are found having influence on earnings management, weak 
correlation between independent variables and earnings management is also found as shown by the 
low adjusted R-Square (4.6%). Therefore, as a recommendation, future research could study the 
impact of ownership strucuture, board of directors’ characteristics, and firm factors on real activity-
based earnings management. Finally, the existing limitations may be overcomed by adding data to 
obtain higher generalization to overcome normality issues and conduct transformation data 
procedures to solve heteroscedasticity problem.  
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